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ABSTRACT 
 This study examines board meetings’ role in reducing the information gap 
between managers and independent directors. Using abnormal returns to insider trades as 
a proxy for insiders’ information level, I find no association between board meetings and 
the manager-director information gap for the pre-2003 period. However, in the post-2003 
period, board meetings significantly increase directors’ information level relative to that 
of managers. I next identify that board meetings’ informational role is driven by the 2003 
NASDAQ and NYSE board independence requirements. Further analyses support a 
causal link between board meetings and the smaller manager-director information gap 
post-2003. Furthermore, board meetings’ information role is more pronounced for 
directors who are relatively new to the firm, diverse directors, directors with outside 
connections, and directors sitting on certain committees. Lastly, using a subsample of 
firms that voluntarily disclose disaggregated information on board meetings, I find that 
the form of board meetings also matters: in-person board meetings reduce the manager-
director information gap, while remote board meetings do not. Overall, board meetings’ 
informational efficacy depends on mandatory board independence, independent directors’ 
characteristics, and board meetings’ organizational forms. 
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BOARD MEETINGS AND THE INFORMATION GAP BETWEEN  
MANAGERS AND INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Independent directors, who do not participate in the day-to-day management of 
the company, have a natural information disadvantage vis-à-vis corporate insiders. 
Whether independent directors are “kept in the dark” by corporate executives remains a 
concern among governance practitioners and academics.1  Prior literature documents the 
existence of an information gap between executives and independent directors (e.g., 
Ravina & Sapienza, 2010; Duellman et al., 2018). Nonetheless, how directors acquire 
private information remains an open question. An understanding of the channels that 
facilitate directors’ information acquisition is critical to organizational design practices 
that optimize information exchange in the upper echelons of public corporations. Board 
meetings, where executives and independent directors typically meet to discuss various 
corporate issues, serve as the primary channel through which independent directors can 
gain private information from executives. This study examines board meetings as a 
potential information channel for independent directors. While private information is not 
observable, I use reported insider trades by directors and officers as a proxy therefor. 
Companies in the U.S. are required to hold an annual shareholder meeting, which 
all directors are expected to attend. Beyond that, there is no specific requirement on board 
	
1 Following the 1991 Salomon Scandal, Warren Buffet wrote in his letter to shareholders that the 
outside directors of Salomon had been “kept in the dark” by the management team 
(https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-02-16-tm-4654-story.html). In another more recent 





meeting frequency. Companies vary in their own board meeting policies and typically 
specify them in their bylaws or Corporate Governance Guidelines.2  Typically, U.S. firms 
hold at least 4 board meetings a year (referred to as regular meetings or ordinary 
meetings), plus any number of special meetings where necessary. Logistically, firms may 
hold all or a portion of board meetings in-person or remotely.3 A small fraction of firms 
voluntarily disclose the number of in-person and remote board meetings; among those 
firms, on average about one-third of board meetings per year are held remotely. In 
addition to the variation in firm-level practices, past decades witnessed a steady increase 
in the average number of board meetings of U.S. public firms (Figure 1A and 1B 
illustrate this trend). Hence, it is worthwhile for academics and regulators to understand 
the role and functioning of board meetings.  
Despite board meetings being an intuitive channel for information exchange 
between corporate insiders and independent directors, in practice the effectiveness of 
such channel in reducing the information gap between the two groups may depend on 
various factors. First, there is structural information asymmetry between the CEO and its 
board. As Jensen (1993) describes in the “information problems of the board”: the CEO 
almost always determines the agenda and decides which information to give to the board. 
Meanwhile, the board evaluates the CEO. Hence, it is not clear whether the information 
	
2 To illustrate, Hess Corp specifies in its Corporate Governance Guidelines that its board holds 8 
regularly scheduled meetings each year (https://www.hess.com/investors); while Honeywell 
International Inc. states both in its bylaws and Corporate Governance Guidelines that the number of 
regular meetings each year is determined in advance by the Board 
(http://investor.honeywell.com/Governance-Documents). In practice, Honeywell International Inc. 
holds 7 to 13 board meetings each year in my sample period. 
3 Firms disclose differential compensation standards for attending in-person and remote board 




that directors receive at board meetings is valuable, especially for monitoring purposes. 
Second, I posit that the broader institutional environment plays a role in 
narrowing independent directors’ information disadvantage. I expect independent 
directors to be more empowered to acquire information from managers during board 
meetings after the governance reforms of 2003. Indeed, following the corporate scandals 
of the early 2000s, several reforms — chief among which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
and board independence requirements by stock exchanges — stepped up scrutiny of 
corporate executives and directors, but also gave a stronger mandate for directors to 
monitor managers. 
Third, I expect that the extent to which directors are able to benefit from board 
meetings in narrowing their information gap with managers is related to their individual 
characteristics. If board meetings indeed serve as information channels, it stands to 
reason that this channel is more important for directors who have a greater firm-specific 
information disadvantage that makes board meetings more important firm-specific 
information channel to them, and for directors with certain expertise or greater 
industry/market information that give them an information processing advantage. 
Fourth, I expect that in-person board meetings and remote board meetings differ 
in their informational role. Although the topics being discussed at in-person and remote 
meetings should not differ, it may be more difficult for participants to conduct thorough 
discussions at a distance. Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that directors acquire non-
public information from non-director insiders outside the board room when attending in-




such informal channels for private information. 
I gather U.S. public firms’ board meeting frequencies from their proxy statements 
in SEC Edgar for the 2006–2015 period. I merge this data with ExecuComp, which 
collected information on board meeting frequency between 1992 and 2005 to form a 
panel sample over the 1992–2015 period. Following prior literature, I use abnormal 
returns to insider purchases as a proxy for their level of private information. I first 
examine the association between board meeting frequency and the information gap 
between executives and independent directors. I find that when the board meets more 
frequently, directors gain more from their stock purchases while managers gain less, 
which indicates that the information gap between the two groups becomes smaller, but 
only in the post-2003 period. 
To better understand why the results only hold after 2003, I examine the effects of 
NYSE and NASDAQ board independence requirements on board meetings’ 
informational role using a difference-in-differences design. I find that the post-2003 
manager-director information gap reduction through board meetings is driven by firms 
that did not have sufficiently independent boards pre-requirements. That is, executives 
lose more of their information advantage relative to independent directors when the board 
meets more frequently in firms that are exogenously required to increase board 
independence. This result suggests that board independence is a prerequisite for board 
meetings to be an effective channel to reduce independent directors’ information 
disadvantage. I further examine the effects of Section 403 of SOX, as SOX Section 403 




— and possibly mimic — insiders’ transactions much more quickly. However, I find no 
evidence that the results post-2003 are driven by the shorter disclosure window as 
required by SOX Section 403. 
Next I explore variations among directors and within the form of board meetings. 
At individual directors’ level, I find that board meetings are a more important information 
channel for directors who are relatively new to the firm, for diverse directors, for 
directors with outside connections, and for directors sitting on audit, compensation, and 
nomination committees. In contrast, directors attending less than 75% of total board 
meetings do not gain significant private information at board meetings. Using a small 
sample of firms that voluntarily disclose the number of board meetings held in-person 
and remotely, I examine whether in-person meetings and remote meetings differ in 
directors’ information acquisition. Results indicate that in-person meetings significantly 
decrease the manager-director information gap, while remote meetings do not. 
Since board meetings and insiders’ information advantage may be endogenously 
determined, I use a difference-in-differences analysis to provide causal inference in the 
post-2003 period. An extensive literature in economics and finance shows that policy 
uncertainty as induced by presidential or gubernatorial elections affect business activities 
in political sensitive industries. Following this line of literature, I first observe that 
presidential elections increase board meeting frequency in political sensitive industries. I 
posit that presidential elections increase board meetings in these industries without 
increasing independent directors’ level of private information of their firms, so that the 




Using a difference-in-differences design, I show that presidential elections decrease 
manager-director information gap for firms in political sensitive industries via increased 
board meetings.   
 My research design is subject to two additional concerns, which I address in 
robustness tests. I measure board meetings at annual level, while insider trades occur 
throughout the year. This creates a mismatch between number of board meetings the 
insider attends and the abnormal returns of insider’s trades. Further, there could be 
reverse causality if directors’ purchase of shares incentivizes them to actively request 
more information, thus leading to more board meetings. To address these two issues, I 
conduct a set of lead-lag analyses using four alternative measures of board meetings. I 
calculate the estimated board meeting frequencies for the 12-month period before and 
after each insider trade, and test the effects of these two measures, together with the 
actual meeting frequencies in year t-1 and t+1, on the manager-director information gap. 
Results show that directors’ information gap is associated with the board meeting 
frequencies for the 12-month period ahead of each trade, but not associated with 12-
month post-trade meeting frequencies, nor actual meeting frequencies in year t-1 or t+1. 
This set of results demonstrate that the main results are not influenced by the mismatch 
between meetings and trade timing, and are not driven by reverse causality. 
This study makes several contributions. First, it extends the literature on board 
meetings by examining their informational role. Board meetings, despite being a major 
channel through which independent directors fulfill their roles, have received little 




frequencies over fiscal year 1999 to 2005 as a proxy for board monitoring and show that 
board meeting frequency is positively associated with Tobin’s Q; Schwartz-Ziv and 
Weisbach (2013) provide evidence on the content of board meetings using the board 
meeting minutes collected from eleven Israeli companies. My study spans 24 years of 
data and shows that board meetings are an effective information channel for independent 
directors, subject to mandatory board independence. Specifically, after the 
implementation of board independence requirements, the information gap between the 
two groups is eliminated after 10 board meetings per year on average. My study also 
provides in-depth evidence on the cross-sectional variation in director and meeting 
characteristics associated with the informational role of board meetings. 
Second, this study contributes to the insider trading literature in two ways. First, I 
document a new channel that explains cross-sectional variation in the information gap 
between managers and independent directors (Ravina and Sapienza, 2010). Second, while 
prior literature shows that corporate governance quality reduces insiders’ informed 
trading (Jagolinzer et al., 2011; Dai et al., 2016), there is no direct evidence on whether 
and how independent directors limit managers’ insider trading profitability. This study 
fills the gap by showing that directors do so when they know what their managers know. 
Specifically, the more independent directors interact with managers, the less profitable 
managers’ insider purchases. 
Lastly, this study contributes to the literature on the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ 
board independence requirements, which prior literature has shown to affect treated 




and Grinstein, 2007). This study finds that the board independence requirements allow 
treated firms’ independent directors to effectively extract information from managers, 
indicating the importance of independent directors’ access to information to perform their 
duties. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional 
background and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes research design and data. 
Section 4 reports results of empirical tests on hypotheses. Section 5 provides additional 
tests. Section 6 concludes. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Institutional Background 
2.1.1 Board Meetings 
Public companies in the U.S. are required by state corporate law and federal 
securities law to hold a meeting for shareholders at least once each year. While directors 
are expected to attend the annual shareholder meeting, there is no additional requirement 
on board meeting frequency. However, there are requirements on the disclosure of board 
meeting related information. Item 407 of Regulation S-K requires the disclosure of the 
total number of board meetings held in that year in the proxy statements, as well as the 
disclosure of directors who missed more than 25% of total meetings.  
Firms vary in their requirements on board meetings. The common conduct for 
U.S. public firms appears to be at least four regular meetings per year, plus any special 
meetings where necessary. Firms also vary in their disclosure of board meeting related 




firms further disclose number of meetings held in-person and/or remotely, and number of 
regular meetings and special meetings. A small number of firms also disclose the date 
and a brief description of the agenda for the meeting.4,5 
Boardroom discussions typically contain confidential non-public information. The 
non-public information exchanged and discussed inside the boardrooms falls into three 
categories: (1) proprietary information that is of competitive and commercial value to the 
firm; (2) inside information about the company’s finances, operations, and strategy; (3) 
sensitive information regarding board proceedings and deliberations (Katz & McIntosh, 
2014). Using a unique dataset of the board meeting minutes from eleven companies, 
Schwartz-Ziv & Weisbach (2013) find that the issues discussed at board meetings support 
both the supervisory and the managerial role of the board, with the former being more 
prominent. In addition, the acquisition of private information may also occur outside of 
the boardroom. In its report Governance Challenges 2018, the National Association of 
Corporate Directors (NACD) describes a board meeting day for a multinational company 
where during breakfast each independent director meets with over nine senior leaders to 
discuss issues ranging from business philosophy, strategy, to the company’s current 
concerns. This suggests the possibility that, although the CEO may decide what 
	
4 It is rare for firms to include a date and a description of the agenda in their disclosures. For the cases 
that I observe, when some firms encounter M&A or spin-offs, they hold more special board meetings 
and thus may briefly describe these meetings in their proxy statements. 
5 Ideally, I would explore the differentiated effects of in-person meetings versus remote meetings, and 
regular meetings versus special meetings, in terms of information exchange. However, not all firms 
provide disaggregated data on the types of meetings; further, not all firms distinguish between regular 
and special meetings. In this research, I use the total number of board meetings as my main variable of 
interest. In additional analysis, I provide evidence that in-person meetings and remote meetings differ 




information to provide to the independent directors inside the boardroom (Jensen, 1993), 
directors are able to gain non-public information from communications that occur outside 
of the boardroom. 
Attendance at board meetings impacts information acquisition by independent 
directors. Masulis & Mobbs (2014) show that independent directors are more likely to 
attend meetings of more prestigious boards. Foreign independent directors are also more 
likely to miss board meetings due to their geographic distance. As an example, Masulis et 
al. (2012) finds that having foreign independent directors is associated with less board 
monitoring. 
2.1.2 Insider Trading and the Manager-Director Information Gap 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that corporate directors and officers 
report their trades to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC). This 
requirement enables investors and researchers to observe a potentially informative signal 
at the individual director- and officer-level.  
Prior research shows that insider purchases and their timely disclosures precede 
significantly positive abnormal returns (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Brochet, 2010). 
In contrast, while the informativeness of insider sales varies cross-sectionally (e.g., 
Jagolinzer 2009; Cohen et al., 2012), sale transactions remain uninformative on average. 
This empirical regularity is attributed to diversification or liquidity needs as a first-order 
driver of insider sales, in addition to the asymmetric litigation risk associated with trading 
on bad rather than good news (e.g., Rogers, 2008). 




insiders’ possession of private information, and (b) insiders’ willingness and ability to 
trade on private information. Using abnormal returns over the six-month window 
following purchase transactions as an indirect measure of the level of insiders’ private 
information, Ravina & Sapienza (2010) shows that both executives and independent 
directors’ purchases contain private information. More importantly, as compared to 
executives, independent directors’ purchases are less informative, thus confirming that 
there exists an information gap between executives and independent directors. Further, 
Duellman et al. (2018) demonstrate that directors with financial expertise enjoy higher 
abnormal returns, Cao et al. (2015) find an association between directors’ social ties with 
executives and their level of private information. 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1 Board Meetings and the Information Gap between Managers and Independent 
Directors 
Independent directors obtain and share information and make corporate-specific 
decisions at board meetings. The frequency of board meetings reveals the intensity of 
board activities. Using a hand-collected sample of 307 public companies during 1990 to 
1994, Vafeas (1999) shows that the high frequency of board meetings typically follows a 
decline in firm value, and that abnormally high board activity is associated with 
improvements in performance in the following years. It suggests that the frequency of 
board meetings can be informative of board activity and performance. Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that independent directors, who are outsiders to the firm relative to 




Board meetings may also be “window-dressing”. In the organization of modern 
public companies, the chairman of the board typically runs board meetings and (jointly 
with the CEO) sets the board’s agenda. However, prior research questions the 
effectiveness of board meetings as a channel for directors to gain material information 
from the managers, especially when such information may work against CEO’s 
incentives. Jensen (1993) points out that the CEO almost always determines the 
information given to the board. Hermalin & Weisbach (1998) show that the board’s 
monitoring intensity increases with the precision of the information on CEO 
performance. Verrecchia (2001) further analyzes that managers are not likely to share 
information that is detrimental to their own interests. This line of analyses draws to the 
conflict between the CEO and the directors informational-wise: a monitoring-averse CEO 
may not be willing to share non-public information with the board, especially if such 
information works against his/her performance evaluation. 
Another challenge to the effectiveness of board meetings as an information 
channel lies in the credibility of private communications. As Bushman, Chen, Engel, and 
Smith (2004) point out, private communications can be less credible than public 
disclosures, in part because public disclosures are subject to SEC rules and auditor 
scrutiny, while private communications are not. Hence, the information that directors 
gather at board meetings may not help towards decreasing their information gap with 
managers. 
Given the conflicting predictions, the effect of board meetings on the manager-




H1: The information gap between managers and independent directors does not 
vary with the frequency of board meetings. 
If directors are able to gain private information at board meetings, holding 
constant their willingness to trade, then their abnormal returns from purchases shall be 
positively associated with the number of board meetings that they attend. Directors’ 
willingness to trade may increase if they intend to extract rents from the newly acquired 
private information. However, Brochet and Srinivasan (2014) find that trading on private 
information increases independent directors’ litigation risk. Hence, risk-averse individual 
directors may also refrain from trading even if they possess private information.  
For managers, the directors’ acquisition of information at board meetings may 
impose a monitoring effect on their own trading incentives, in the sense that the directors 
now know what material information the managers possess. In that case, board meeting 
frequency shall be negatively associated with managers’ abnormal returns from 
purchases. 
H1a: More (less) board meetings is not associated with directors’ abnormal 
returns from their purchases. 
H1b: More (less) board meetings is not associated with managers’ abnormal 
returns from their purchases. 
2.2.2 Time Series Changes in the Information Gap between Managers and Directors 
Over the last decades, there have been significant changes to the corporate 
governance landscape which likely affect the information dynamics between managers 




profiled corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002. Both NASDAQ and NYSE announced 
proposals of new governance requirements, both requiring that all firms have a majority 
of independent directors. The proposals were approved by the SEC in November 2003. 
Since then, studies have shown that the board independence requirements have improved 
boards’ monitoring, as reflected in earnings quality (Chen et al., 2015), firm value 
(Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007), and information environment (Armstrong et al., 
2014).  
The impact of board independence on independent directors’ nonpublic 
information acquisition remains unexamined. On one hand, having a majority of 
independent directors may change the dynamics inside the boardroom, thus giving 
independent directors more power to request information. On the other hand, as noted by 
Holmstrom (2004) and Adams and Ferreira (2007), when board independence increases, 
managers may be reluctant to disclose information that could be used for disciplining 
purposes, if they believe that board independence will lead to more intense board 
monitoring. Further, Raheja (2005) theoretically shows that when board independence 
increases, outside directors lose access to private information via the decreased number 
of inside directors on board. 
The 2002–2003 period also corresponds to the passage of SOX, ushering a new 
corporate governance era. Major requirements of SOX include restrictions on accounting 
firms’ non-assurance services, executive certification of financial reports, and disclosure 
of managerial assessment of internal control. A line of research provide evidence that 




(2014)), and that the board trust managers’ disclosure more in the post-SOX period 
(Carter et al., 2009). Section 403 of SOX shortened insiders’ reporting window of insider 
transactions from 10 days to 2 business days. Brochet (2010) examines this setting and 
shows an increase in the information content of insider trading filings post-SOX 403. The 
shorter lag between transactions and their disclosures reduces the leakage of insiders’ 
private information prior to the disclosure of their trades. While this may affect managers 
and directors alike, an open question is whether the more-timely disclosure reduces the 
information gap between those parties. 
Combined, I expect the governance reforms of 2003 to empower independent 
directors in their mandate to monitor executives and obtain greater information from 
them, including during board meetings. 
H2: The association between board meetings and the manager-director 
information gap is stronger after 2003. 
2.2.3 Independent Directors’ Characteristics and Information Acquisition 
A line of literature shows that independent directors differ in their level of private 
information. For example, Cao et al. (2015) find that directors with social ties to 
executives enjoy higher abnormal returns to their trades, suggesting the existence of 
private information channels outside the boardroom; Duellman et al. (2018) find that 
financial expert directors obtain higher abnormal returns, indicating directors’ expertise 
and/or experience assist in their information acquisition. Following this line of literature, 





Directors’ possession of and access to firm-specific private information is a major 
determinant of the board meetings’ informational role: if an independent director has a 
smaller firm-specific information set, or the director has limited or no access to informal 
information channels such as through social ties, then the information that she receives 
through board meetings should be more significantly associated with her trading 
profitability. Directors with shorter tenure suffer from a firm-specific information 
disadvantage compared to their more senior board members (Huang & Hilary, 2018). 
Diverse directors (female and racial minority) are shown to be significantly less likely to 
play central roles on boards (Field et al., 2020), indicating their disadvantageous 
positions. I thus posit that board meetings represent a more important information 
channel for relatively new directors, and for diverse directors.  
H3a: The association between board meetings and directors’ private information 
level is stronger for directors relatively new to the firm and for diverse (female and 
racial minority) directors. 
Directors’ expertise and knowledge can help them process information at board 
meetings. Directors sitting on the three major committees (audit, compensation, and 
nominating committees) have greater expertise (Kesner, 1988), and directors with outside 
board seats are more connected and informed with industry/market knowledge (Goldman 
et al., 2009; Goergen et al., 2019). I thus predict that these two types of directors show 





H3b: The association between board meetings and directors’ private information 
level is stronger for directors with committee memberships and for connected 
directors. 
Lastly, if directors miss board meetings, the number of board meetings shall not 
be associated with their information level. 
H3c: The association between board meetings and directors’ private information 
level is weaker for directors who are absent from (some of) the board meetings. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA  
3.1 Empirical Models 
3.1.1 Board Meetings and Manager-Director Information Gap, and Time Series Changes 
My baseline model examines the association between board meeting frequency 
and managers and independent directors’ insider purchase abnormal returns. I first filter 
insider purchases made by managers and independent directors, and label independent 
directors’ purchases with the categorical variable DIRECTOR. Next I interact the 
DIRECTOR dummy with board meeting frequency (LOGMF) to test for the association 
between board meetings and the manager-director information gap: 
BHAR = a0 + b1 DIRECTOR*LOGMF + b2 LOGMF + b3 DIRECTOR +  b4 
SIZE + b5 BTM + b6 LEV + b7 RET + b8 RETVOL + b9 ROA + b10 CAPEX 
+ b11 M&A + b12 CEO_CHAIR + b13 CEO_TENURE + b14 LAGTRADE + 
b15 RESTRICT + Firm Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it (1) 
 




day period after each purchase transaction.6 I control for firm size (SIZE), book-to-market 
ratio (BTM), and leverage (LEV) for firm characteristics, cumulative stock returns (RET) 
and stock return volatility (RETVOL) for the 12-month period ahead of each transaction 
and annual return on assets (ROA) for firm performance and risk,  capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) and indicator variable of M&A (M&A) for the need for directors’ advisory role, 
and CEO-chair duality (CEO_CHAIR) and CEO tenure (CEO_TENURE) for CEO power 
and entrenchment. RESTRICT proxies for the firm’s restrictions on insider trading, 
following Roulstone (2003). LAGTRADE is a dummy variable of 1 if the director 
purchases within 3 days of an executive’s filing of purchase transaction, indicating the 
possibility that the director gets information from the executive’s filing rather than from 
board meetings. Appendix A provides definition of all variables. I include firm- and year-
fixed effects to control for firm-level time-invariant factors and time-series differences 
that may influence insiders’ abnormal returns. Among others, firms vary substantially in 
their requirements for board meetings and rules for insider trading, which were set when 
the firm was first incorporated and in firm’s insider trading policies. I cluster standard 
errors by firm and fiscal year to adjust for the correlation of standard errors within years 
and across time by firm (Petersen, 2009). 
The variables of interest are LOGMF and DIRECTOR*LOGMF. After controlling 
for firm and year fixed effects, the variable LOGMF captures the effect of that fiscal 
	
6 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits round-trip transactions, defined as a purchase 
(sale) and a subsequent sale (purchase) within a six-month period by the same insider. Under Rule 
16(b), the company may recover profits from round-trip trades made within the six-month window. I 
thus follow prior literature (e.g., Ravina & Sapienza, 2009) and use buy-and-hold abnormal returns 




year’s board meetings on managers’ abnormal returns during the same period. That is, if 
the firm’s number of board meetings during that fiscal year is associated with managers’ 
trading proceeds, then the coefficient on LOGMF shall be significantly different from 
zero. The interaction term DIRECTOR*LOGMF captures the incremental effect of board 
meetings on directors’ abnormal returns. If directors gain non-public information from 
board meetings and trade on the information, then the coefficient on the interaction term 
DIRECTOR*LOGMF shall be positive and significant. To reject the null hypothesis that 
board meetings are not associated with the manager-director information gap (H1), either 
b1, b2, or both, should be significantly different from zero. Further, b1 will need to be 
significantly different from zero to reject H1a, and b2 will need to be negative and 
significantly different from zero to reject H1b. 
I first run Equation (1) over sample period 1992 to 2015 to test for H1, H1a, and 
H1b. Next, I run the same regression for subsamples 1992 to 2002 and 2003 to 2015 to 
observe any time series changes in the informational efficacy of board meetings (H2). 
3.1.2 Board Independence Requirements and Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
In order to test for the effects of 2003 board independence requirements or any 
concurrent regulation changes as introduced by SOX on the role of board meetings, I 
conduct the following tests. I first follow Armstrong et al. (2014) and sort firms into a 
treatment group and a control group. Treatment firms are those that did not have a 
majority of independent directors before the board independence requirements, and 
control firms are those that were already in compliance with the requirements, and thus 




is not influenced by any of the public/private discussions about the regulation before its 
approval, I follow Armstrong et al. (2014) and use fiscal year 2000 as the base year to 
identify treated and control firms. Next I conduct the following two tests: 
BHAR = a0 + b1 POST*DIRECTOR_T + b2 POST*DIRECTOR_C + b3 POST + 
b4 DIRECTOR_T + b5  DIRECTOR_C + b6 LOGMF + b7 SIZE + b8 BTM + b9 
LEV + b10 RET + b11 RETVOL + b12 ROA + b13 CAPEX + b14 M&A + b15 
CEO_CHAIR + b16 CEO_TENURE + b17 LAGTRADE + b18 RESTRICT + Firm 
Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it          (2)         
BHAR = a0 + b1 POST*DIRECTOR_T*LOGMF + b2 
POST*DIRECTOR_C*LOGMF + b3 POST*DIRECTOR_T +  b4 
POST*DIRECTOR_C + b5 DIRECTOR_T*LOGMF + b6 
DIRECTOR_C*LOGMF + b7 POST*LOGMF + b8 POST + b9 DIRECTOR_T + 
b10  DIRECTOR_C + b11 LOGMF + b12 SIZE + b13 BTM + b14 LEV + b15 RET + 
b16 RETVOL + b17 ROA + b18 CAPEX + b19 M&A + b20 CEO_CHAIR + b21 
CEO_TENURE + b22 LAGTRADE + b23 RESTRICT + Firm Fixed Effects + Year 
Fixed Effects + e it  (3)         
The variables DIRECTOR_T and DIRECTOR_C assume the value of one for independent 
directors in the treatment and control firms, respectively; and zero otherwise. Post 
assumes the value of one for fiscal years of 2004 and after, and zero otherwise (the 
deadline for firms to reach board independence is fiscal year 2004). Control variables are 
the same as in Equation (1). Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and year level. 
Since board independence requirements only affected the treated firms while SOX 
or other concurrent changes in market conditions affect all firms, I am thus able to 
separate their effects. In Equation (2) I measure the direct effects of any of the regulations 
or concurrent market changes on the manager-director information gap: if the board 
independence requirements had an direct effect on the manager-director information gap, 




SOX had a direct effect on the information gap, then I expect both b1 and b2 in Equation 
(2) to be significantly different from zero. In Equation (3) I further interact LOGMF with 
the two director indicators and examine the regulations’ effect through board meetings: if 
the board independence requirements affect directors’ information acquisition at board 
meetings, then I expect b1 in Equation (3) to be significantly different from zero, but not 
b2; if SOX affects directors’ information acquisition at board meetings, then I expect both 
b1 and b2 in Equation (3) to be significantly different from zero. 
3.1.3 Independent Directors’ Characteristics and Information Acquisition 
In H3 I examine whether independent directors differ in their information 
acquisition efficiency at board meetings based on their characteristics. I test five types of 
status/characteristics: (a) directors who are relatively new to the firm (TENURE_L) 
versus directors with longer tenures (TENURE_H); (b) diverse directors who are female 
or belong to underrepresented racial minorities (DIVERSE) versus non-diverse directors 
(NONDIVERSE); (c) directors who sit on committees (COMM) versus directors who do 
not (NONCOMM); (d) directors with outside board seats (CONNECTED) versus directors 
without (NONCONNECTED); and (d) directors who attend less than 75% of total board 
meetings during that fiscal year (ATTENDLESS) versus directors who do not (ATTEND). 
In the following regression, TYPE_A and NON_TYPE_A indicate the abovementioned 
classifications. I include firm and year fixed effects, and cluster the standard errors at the 





BHAR = a0 + b1 TYPE_A*LOGMF + b2 NON_TYPE_A*LOGMF + b3 TYPE_A + 
b4 NON_TYPE_A + b5 LOGMF + b6 SIZE + b7 BTM + b8 LEV + b9 RET + b10 
RETVOL + b11 ROA + b12 CAPEX + b13 M&A + b14 CEO_CHAIR + b15 
CEO_TENURE + b16 LAGTRADE + b17 RESTRICT + Firm Fixed Effects + Year 
Fixed Effects + e it         (4) 
3.2 Data and Sample Construction 
3.2.1 Data on Board Meetings 
I collect the number of board meetings from proxy statements for the period 2006 to 
2015.7 I then combine this manually collected sample with ExecuComp’s data for the 
period 1992 to 2005,8 and construct a sample of board meeting frequency for 1992 to 
2015.  Figure 1 presents trends of board meeting frequency during the sample period. 
Figure 1A plots the mean and the 1 to 99, and 5 to 95 percentiles of board meetings by 
fiscal year. All distribution points peak during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Excluding 
the financial crisis years, there is still a slow and steady increase over time in board 
meeting frequencies. 
One concern with the effectiveness of board meetings is that firms may hold a 
constant number of meetings over time. This suggests that that board meetings may be 
merely a “rubber stamping” or “window-dressing” rather than an effective corporate 
governance mechanism. Thus I plot in Figure 1B for each year the percentage of firms 
that changed their meeting frequency from the prior year. This statistic also peaks during 
the financial crisis and exhibits an increase over time. Further, the percentage is greater 
	
7 I use Python to locate the sentence disclosing board meetings by keywords, and then extract the 
numeric information from the sentence. In case where more than one numbers are identified in one 
sentence, I hand-collect the number of board meetings from the sentence. 
8 ExecuComp stopped providing information on board meeting frequency in fiscal year 2006, for 




than 50% for the entire sample period, indicating that firms are more likely than not to 
adjust the number of board meetings each year. 
In order to provide more insights into the possible determinants of board meetings 
frequency, I analyze the association between board meetings frequency and firm 
characteristics. I estimate Equation (5) first for the entire sample period, then for the 
subsamples of 1992 to 2002, and 2003 to 2015, to examine any change over time.  
LOGMF= a0 + b1 SIZE + b2 BTM + b3 LEV + b4 RET_FY + b5 
RETVOL_FY + b6 ROA + b7 CAPEX + b8 M&A + b9 CEO_CHAIR + b10 
CEO_TENURE +  Firm Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it (5) 
 
Results are tabulated in Table 3. Consistent with Vafeas (1999) and Brick & 
Chidambaran (2010) who examine the determinants of board meeting frequencies over 
the periods of 1990 to 1994 and 1999 to 2005 respectively, my result shows that larger 
and poorly performing (in terms of stock returns and ROA) firms, firms with higher 
book-to-market, leverage, and stock return volatility tend to meet more frequently. 
Coefficients on CEO tenure and CEO-chairman duality are both negative, suggesting that 
CEO entrenchment is associated with lower frequency of board activities. The subsample 
analyses show that the directions of the coefficients are consistent over time, while their 
significance vary. 
3.2.2 Sample Construction 
I start with ExecuComp firms to collect board meetings, then I merge with 
Compustat for financial data, and with CRSP for stock returns. Next I merge with 




only purchases made by executives and independent directors in my main analyses. I 
exclude financial and utilities industries following Ravina and Sapienza (2010). 
Following insider trading literature, I exclude transactions at a stock price of less than $2 
or transactions with fewer than 100 shares. My final sample consists of 31,553 firm-
years, and 69,665 insider purchases. Table 1 tabulates the sample construction 
procedures. 
Table 2 Panel A presents summary statistics. 47.6% of purchase transactions are 
made by managers, and 52.4% are made by independent directors. Table 2 Panel B and 
Panel C report the Pearson correlations for firm-level variables and transaction-level 
variables. Board meeting frequency positively correlates with firm size, leverage, stock 
return volatility, and M&A, and negatively correlates with stock returns, ROA, CEO-
Chairman duality, CEO tenure, and capital expenditure. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Board Meetings as Information Channel and Time Series Changes 
4.1.1 Univariate Analyses 
I first conduct univariate analyses on managers’ and directors’ purchase returns. I 
group observations into five quintiles based on the number of board meetings9, and then 
test the differences between the buy-and-hold abnormal returns of managers’ and 
directors’ purchases within each quintile. If directors efficiently obtain information at 
board meetings, we shall observe a narrowing information gap as board meeting 
	





Results are tabulated in Table 4. Panel A presents the results for the entire sample 
period. The difference between managers’ and directors’ abnormal returns is largest and 
most significant when boards meet four or fewer times per year (diff. = 0.077, t-stat = 
7.23). The difference becomes insignificant when boards meet 12 or more times per year 
(diff. = -0.006, t-stat = -0.51). Further, managers and directors exhibit differences in the 
change of their average returns when board meetings increase from the first to the fifth 
quintile: the average abnormal return drops by more than half for managers, while it 
decreases slightly for independent directors. For both groups, the differences between the 
first and fifth quintiles are statistically significant, suggesting that board meeting 
frequency is also associated with the information asymmetry between reporting insiders 
and investors.  
A closer examination of pre- and post-2003 subsamples reveals that the results in 
Panel A are driven by the post-2003 period. Pre-2003 period (Panel B) shows no 
significant trend in the information gap across quintiles. In the post-2003 period (Panel 
C), the difference in returns between the two groups monotonically decreases and 
becomes insignificant in the fifth quintile. 
4.1.2 Multivariate Analyses 
Univariate analyses suggest that board meetings are negatively associated with the 
manager-director information gap, especially post-2003. Next I conduct multivariate 
analyses to further examine this association. Table 5 presents the results of the main test, 




gap when I extend the period to 2015 which includes post-SOX years, since the sample of 
Ravina and Sapienza (2010) stops at 2003. As shown in Table 5 Column (1). The 
indicator variable DIRECTOR measures the difference between the abnormal returns of 
executives and independent directors. Column (1) presents a negative and significant 
coefficient on DIRECTOR (coeff. = -0.025, p-value < 0.01), indicating that independent 
directors on average earn 2.5% less than managers from their purchases, and the 
difference is statistically significant.  
Column (2) through Column (5) of Table 5 test Equation (1). I separately test 
Equation (1) over the entire sample period (column 2), the 1992 to 2002 period (column 
3), and the 2003 to 2015 period (column 4).  
The coefficient for DIRECTOR*LOGMF is insignificant either in the entire sample 
period (Column (2)), or in the 1992 to 2002 period (Column (3)). In Column (4) the 
coefficient for DIRECTOR*LOGMF is positive and significant (coeff. = 0.069, p-value < 
0.01). The coefficient for LOGMF is significant in the entire sample period (coeff. = 
0.048, p-value < 0.1), driven by the post-2003 period (coeff. = -0.135, p-value < 0.01). In 
contrast, LOGMF is insignificant in the pre-2003 period. Figure 1 shows that board 
meeting frequency is abnormally high during the global financial crisis. To alleviate 
concerns that the crisis drives the results in Column (4), I run the same regression for the 
period of 2003 to 2015, but excluding 2007 to 2009. Column (5) shows that the results 
are consistent after excluding that period. 
In terms of economic significance, the median and 75th percentile of number of 




the post-2003 period, when a firm’s board meeting frequency moves from the median to 
the 75th percentile, the difference between managers’ and independent directors’ 
abnormal returns decreases by 2.46% on average. Further, at 10 board meetings per year, 
the information gap between managers and independent directors disappears for the 
average firm-year (this is calculated as 0.069*log(10) – 0.159 = 0). 
Hence, the results in Table 5 fail to reject the null hypotheses H1 and H1a for the 
entire sample period. However, subsample analyses reject H1, H1a, and H1b for the post-
2003 period, suggesting that the 2003 regulatory changes may have enabled board 
meetings’ role in decreasing the manager-director information gap. To test H2, I further 
conduct two F-tests for coefficients between columns (3) and (4). As shown at the bottom 
of Table 5, coefficients for DIRECTOR*LOGMF are statistically different in Column (3) 
and Column (4) (F-stat = 3.62, p-value = 0.057), and coefficients for LOGMF are 
statistically different in the two columns (F-stat = 11.45, p-value < 0.01). Thus the results 
in Table 5 support H2 that there exist time-series changes in the association between 
board meetings and manager-director information gap, and that the association is stronger 
in the post-2003 period. 
Taken together, the results in Table 5 suggest that (a) a  larger number of board 
meetings is associated with a lower manager-director information gap, but this 
association only holds after the regulation changes that took place in 2003; (b) the 
effectiveness of board meetings as an information channel is different for the pre- and 
post-regulations period, suggesting that the 2003 regulation changes had an influence on 





4.2 Board Independence Requirements and SOX 
I estimate Equations (2) and (3) using OLS regressions to examine the individual 
and/or collective effects of 2003 board independence requirements and SOX on (a) the 
manager-director information gap, and (b) the effectiveness of board meetings as an 
information channel. Results are reported in Table 6. Table 6 Column (1) shows that 
neither POST*DIRECTOR_T nor POST*DIRECTOR_C are significant, indicating neither 
SOX nor board independence requirements had a direct significant effect on the average 
manager-director information gap. In Column (2), POST*DIRECTOR_T*LOGMF is 
positive and significant (coeff. = 0.157, t-stat = 2.97) while 
POST*DIRECTOR_C*LOGMF is not significant (coeff. = -0.014, t-stat = -0.26), 
suggesting board independence requirements had an effect on independent directors’ 
information acquisition at board meetings for the treated firms while rejecting the notion 
that SOX influenced independent directors’ information acquisition at board meetings.  
Taken together, the results in Table 6 show that the 2003 board independence 
requirements enabled independent directors to effectively gain private information, but 
only when board meetings are more frequent. Combined with the results in Table 5, I 
conclude that the 2003 independence requirements enabled the role of board meetings as 
information channels. The fact that only treated directors gain information from board 
channels indicates that exogenously imposed board independence is a prerequisite for 
board meetings to serve as an information gap-reducing channel between independent 




have had an effect on independent directors’ information acquisition, either through 
board meetings or through other potential channels. 
4.3 Independent Directors’ Characteristics and Information Acquisition 
The abovementioned results show an average association between board meeting 
frequency and directors’ information acquisition. There could be cross-sectional variation 
in directors’ ability to acquire information from board meetings. In this section I present 
results indicating that directors’ information acquisition varies with their individual 
characteristics. 
In order to estimate the cross-sectional variation in director characteristics using 
Equation (4), I merge the sample with the ISS dataset by CUSIP, year, and director 
names to obtain directors’ information on tenure, gender, ethnicity, outside board seats, 
attendance, and seats in audit, compensation, and nominating committees and construct 
the variables described in Section 3.1.3.10  
Table 7 presents the results from the above regressions. In column (1) through 
column (5), there are positive and significant coefficients on the interaction terms 
TENURE_L*LOGMF (0.105, P-value<0.01) (col. 1), DIVERSE*LOGMF (0.092, P-
value<0.05) (col. 2), COMM*LOGMF (0.073, P-value<0.01) (col. 3), 
CONNECTED*LOGMF (0.048, P-value<0.1) (col. 4), and ATTEND*LOGMF (0.043, P-
value<0.1) (col. 5), while the coefficients on interaction terms TENURE_H*LOGMF, 
	
10 Prior to 2011, about 44% of listed directors show missing ethnicity in ISS database (classified as 





NONCOMM*LOGMF, NONCONNECTED*LOGMF, and ATTENDLESS*LOGMF are 
statistically insignificant. F-stats on the equality of coefficients TYPE_A*LOGMF and 
NON_TYPE_A*LOGMF are reported in the bottow two rows. The difference between 
TENURE_L*LOGMF and TENURE_H*LOGMF is statistically significant (F-stat=8.64, 
P-value<0.01), and the difference between COMM*LOGMF and NONCOMM*LOGMF 
is statistically significant (F-stat=3.09, P-value<0.1). 
Hence, the results in Table 7 show that there exist cross-sectional variations in 
directors’ information acquisition at board meetings. These results also reinforce the 
interpretation of Tables 5 and 6 as evidence on board meetings’ role for information flow, 
rather than as a proxy of underlying economic events (in which case, all directors would 
be as efficient). 
4.4 Difference-in-differences Model 
The research design thus far does not rule out that unobservable factors may drive 
both board meeting frequency and insiders’ abnormal returns. In this section I address 
endogeneity concerns using a difference-in-differences model. I use presidential elections 
as an exogenous shock that increases the number of board meetings for political sensitive 
industries while not directly reducing the manager-director non-public information gap to 
test the informational role of board meetings for independent directors. The influence of 
politics on the economy and business activities has long been an area of research in 
economics and finance. Specifically, studies have examined the effect of presidential 
elections or gubernatorial elections on stock market value, stock returns, investments, and 





I follow Julio and Yook (2012) and classify energy, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, 
aerospace, defense, telecommunication services, and tobacco industries as political 
sensitive industries, and group the rest of industries as other industries. In Figure 2, I plot 
the average of board meetings in political sensitive industries and other industries by 
year. First, board meeting frequencies of political sensitive industries peak at presidential 
election years of 2008 and 2012, as expected; while for other industries, board meeting 
frequencies peak only at 2008, likely because of the financial crisis rather than the 
presidential election. Second, corresponding to my previous finding that board meetings 
were effective after 2003, the covariance of board meetings and presidential elections in 
political sensitive industries also starts after 2003. To avoid the influence of financial 
crisis on board meeting frequencies, I therefore use the period 2010 to 2015 to conduct 
this analysis. 
Next, I run a difference-in-differences regression using Equation (6) for the period 
2010 to 2015. The variable ELECTION_SENSITIVE is an indicator variable that equals 1 
for firms in political sensitive industries in presidential election year (2012), and 0 
otherwise. I propose that the increased board meetings as induced by the presidential 
election shall increase the information level of independent directors, while political 
uncertainty by itself shall not reduce the manager-director gap on firm-specific private 
information. Further, as independent directors gain private information from managers, 
they impose a monitoring effect on the managers, which lowers managers’ insider trading 




b2 is negative and significant. 
BHAR = a0 + b1 ELECTION_SENSITIVE*DIRECTOR*LOGMF + b2 
ELECTION_SENSITIVE *LOGMF + b3 ELECTION_SENSITIVE *DIRECTOR 
+b4 ELECTION_SENSITIVE + b5 LOGMF + b6 DIRECTOR + b7 SIZE + b8 BTM 
+ b9 LEV + b10 RET + b11 RETVOL + b12 ROA + b13 CAPEX + b14 M&A + b15 
CEO_CHAIR + b16 CEO_TENURE + b17 LAGTRADE + b18 RESTRICT + Industry 
Fixed Effects/Firm Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it   (6) 
Results are shown in Table 8. Because firms in political sensitive industries 
possibly share the same set of unobservable industry characteristics, I first run the 
regression with industry and year fixed effects. The result in Column (1) shows that, as 
compared to non-political sensitive industries, firms in political sensitive industries 
exhibit a smaller manager-director information gap during presidential election year, as 
expected. In Column (2), I run the regression with firm and year fixed effects to control 
for firm-level unobservable variables, and continue to find that the information gap for 
political sensitive firms decreases compared to non-political sensitive firms. 
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
5.1 In-person Meetings versus Remote Meetings 
One important factor that can influence the informational role of board meetings 
is how board meetings are held. In this section I examine whether in-person and remote 
board meetings differ in their informational role. Remote meetings are more flexible as 
compared to in-person meetings, thus they may better serve the board’s communication 
needs. Conversely, remote meetings may result in less efficient communication per 
meeting: as studies on virtual shareholder meetings show, virtual shareholder meetings on 




shareholder meetings (Brochet et al., 2021; Shwartz-Ziv, 2021). Thus it is ex ante unclear 
whether remote board meetings are more or less effective as compared to in-person board 
meetings. 
A fraction of firms voluntarily disclose the composition of remote and in-person 
meetings in total board meetings. I collect this information by searching keywords 
“remote(ly)”, “telephonic(ally)”, “conference”, “distant”, “virtual”, “online”, “in person 
(or in-person)”, “physical” in board meeting sentences, and then manually collect the 
number of remote and in-person board meetings. Table 8 Panel A tabulates the number of 
firm-years disclosing the numbers of remote/in-person board meetings by year, as well as 
the mean and median of remote meetings for the disclosed firms each year. The number 
of firms disclosing remote/in-person board meetings peaks at 110 firms in year 2005, 
then gradually drops over the years to slightly above 70 firms.11 In terms of the number 
and fraction of remote meetings, a median firm holds 2 to 4 meetings remotely, which 
accounts for around one-third of total board meetings. I do not observe any increasing or 
decreasing trends in terms of the fraction of remote meetings. 
Next I use Equation (7) to examine and compare in-person and remote board 
meetings. I run Equation (7) separately for in-person board meetings (where 
LOGMF_TYPE is shown as LOGMF_INPERSON), remote board meetings 
(LOGMF_REMOTE), and total board meetings (LOGMF). If firm i runs 7 in-person 
meetings and 3 remote meetings in year t, then LOGMF_INPERSONit equals log(7+1), 
	
11 From my readings of proxy statements, in later years of my sample period, more firms start to use 
vague disclosure such as “the board held 10 meetings either in-person or telephonically” to substitute 




LOGMF_REMOTEit equals log(3+1), and LOGMFit equals log(10).12 If in-person 
meetings and remote meetings differ in informational perspective, I expect b1 to be 
statistically different for DIRECTOR*LOGMF_INPERSON and 
DIRECTOR*LOGMF_REMOTE. Since some firms only disclose once the detailed 
information of in-person/remote board meetings in this sample, to avoid dropping too 
many observations, I use industry fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects in this 
analysis. 
BHAR = a0 + b1 DIRECTOR*LOGMF_TYPE + b2 LOGMF_TYPE + b3 DIRECTOR +  
b4 SIZE + b5 BTM + b6 LEV + b7 RET + b8 RETVOL + b9 ROA + b10 CAPEX + b11 M&A 
+ b12 CEO_CHAIR + b13 CEO_TENURE + b14 LAGTRADE + b15 RESTRICT + Industry 
Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it   (7) 
 
Results are tabulated in Table 9 Panel B. Column 1 indicates that directors’ 
relative level of private information increases with the number of in-person meetings 
(coeff. = 0.314, p<0.05), while Column 2 shows that directors’ relative private 
information level decreases when there are more remote meetings (coeff. = -0.155, 
p<0.10). Column 3 finds no significant association between the total number of board 
meetings and insiders’ information level, consistent with the main finding in Table 5 
Column 1. An F test shows that the coefficients for DIRECTOR*LOGMF_INPERSON 
and DIRECTOR*LOGMF_REMOTE are statistically different (F-stat = 6.74, P < 0.01). 
Thus, in-person board meetings help reduce the information gap between managers and 
independent directors, while remote board meetings do not. 
	
12 Firms’ disclosed number of remote and/or in-person meetings can be zero, while total number of 
board meetings is greater than zero. So I add 1 to the number of remote and in-person meetings in 




5.2 Lead-lag Analyses of Board Meeting Frequencies 
In this section, I conduct a set of lead-lag analyses to examine the possibility of 
reverse causality and to address the mismatch of the measure of board meetings and the 
timing of insider trades. It is possible that when independent directors purchase more 
shares, they may actively require more information, thus leading to more board meetings 
– thus the issue of reverse causality. Since the number of board meetings is measured at 
the fiscal year level, while insider purchases occur throughout the year (Table 10 Panel A 
tabulates insider purchase distribution by the month in fiscal year), this creates a potential 
mismatch between an insider’s information level at the time of purchase and the total 
number of board meetings in that year: the purchases made before the last board meeting 
of the year may not contain the information from all board meetings of that year.  
To address these two issues, I conduct a set of lead-lag analyses using four 
alternative measures of board meetings. The first measure is an estimated board meeting 
frequency for the 12-month period ahead of each insider purchase transaction. This 
measure assumes that the board meetings are roughly evenly distributed over the fiscal 
year. For example, if firm i holds 12 meetings in year t and 6 meetings in year t-1, and 
insider j makes a purchase in the 8th month of year t, then the estimated 12-month pre-
trade board meeting frequency for this transaction is 6÷12*(12 – 8) + 12÷12*8, which 
equals to 10 meetings. The second measure is the estimated board meeting frequency for 
the 12-month period after each purchase using the same method, to examine the issue of 
reverse causality. The third and fourth measures are actual board meeting frequencies in 




timing of board meetings and insiders’ abnormal returns. 
Results are tabulated in Table 10, Panel B to Panel E. Panel B shows the results 
using estimated 12-month pre-trade board meetings (LOGMF_PRETRADE). Consistent 
with the main results (Table 5), I find that for the post-2003 period, the estimated pre-
trade board meeting frequencies is significantly positively associated with directors’ 
abnormal returns (coeff. = 0.082, P-value < 0.01), and is significantly negatively 
associated with managers’ abnormal returns (coeff. = -0.185, P-value < 0.01); I continue 
to fail to find significant association between estimated pre-trade board meetings and 
insiders’ abnormal returns in the pre-2003 period. Results in Panel C using estimated 12-
month post-trade board meetings (LOGMF_POSTTRADE) indicate that directors’ 
abnormal returns are not associated with the estimated post-trade board meeting 
frequencies. Managers’ abnormal returns are negatively associated with post-trade board 
meeting frequencies, suggesting that managers may know ahead of time the need for 
board meetings in the near future, and trade less (more) on the private information that 
may (may not) be shared with the independent directors at board meetings. Panel D and 
Panel E test the association between insiders’ abnormal returns and actual board meeting 
frequencies in year t-1 (Panel D) and year t+1 (Panel E). Both sets of regressions fail to 
find a significant association between insiders’ abnormal returns and board meeting 
frequencies in the post-2003 period. 
Taken together, this set of tests show that the manager-director information gap is 
reduced by and only by the most recent board meetings that the insiders attend before 




the prior/subsequent fiscal year.  
5.3 SOX Section 403 and Directors’ Timing of Purchases Relative to Managers’ 
Section 403 of SOX shortened the disclosure window of insider trades. Brochet 
(2010) empirically demonstrates that post-SOX 403, insider trading disclosures are 
significantly more informative in both abnormal returns and trading volumes. Since 
independent directors are at an information disadvantage relative to executives, it is 
possible that directors learn from the timelier disclosure of executives’ transactions post-
SOX 403. Board meetings enable directors to possess an information set that is closer to 
the executives. Thus directors are abler to learn quickly from executives’ disclosed 
trading transactions when there are more board meetings.  
I examine whether the timing of directors’ purchases relative to those of 
executives changes after SOX. I create an indicator variable LAGTRADE which takes the 
value of 1 if a director makes stock purchases within three days following the disclosure 
of a manager’s purchase. Next I examine how the directors’ likelihood of making 
“piggyback” trades is affected by the number of board meetings and the passage of SOX 
403, using the following two Logit regressions: 
Prob(LAGTRADE) = a0 + b1 SOX403 + b2 LOGMF + b3 SIZE + b4 BTM + 
b5 LEV + b6 RET + b7 RETVOL + b8 ROA + b9 CAPEX + b10 M&A + b11 
CEO_CHAIR + b12 CEO_TENURE + b13 RESTRICT + Firm Fixed Effects + 
Year Fixed Effects + e it   (8) 
Prob(LAGTRADE) = a0 + b1 SOX403*LOGMF + b2 SOX403 + b3 LOGMF 
+ b4 SIZE + b5 BTM + b6 LEV + b7 RET + b8 RETVOL + b9 ROA + b10 
CAPEX + b11 M&A + b12 CEO_CHAIR + b13 CEO_TENURE + b14 




Where SOX403 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the transaction 
occurs after August 29, 2002. All other variables follow the baseline regression. Result of 
regression on Equation (8) is tabulated in Table 11 Column (1). Both SOX403 and 
LOGMF are significantly positively associated with LAGTRADE, indicating that directors 
are more likely to trade immediately after managers (a) after SOX and (b) when the board 
meets more frequently. Table 11 Column (2) tabulates the coefficient estimates for 
Equation (9). The interaction term SOX403*LOGMF is not significant. It shows that the 
shortened disclosure window as enforced by SOX 403 does not strengthen or weaken the 
role of board meetings as an information channel. It further validates my findings from 
Section 4.2 (Table 6) that the significant result post-2003 is not driven by SOX. 
5.4 Board Meetings and Insider Sales 
Insider sales are more likely to be driven by diversification or liquidity motives, 
and thus less informative of insiders’ level of private information than purchases on 
average. Nonetheless, in this section I examine the role of board meetings in conveying 
bad news to independent directors by testing on managers’ and independent directors’ 
insider sales. 
I run the baseline regression for insider sales, and tabulate results in Table 12. 
Table 12 Panel A exhibits the regression for all insider sales transactions. In Table 12 
Panel B, I follow Cohen et al. (2012) and sort insider sales into routine sales and 
opportunistic sales based on insider’s prior 3-year transaction behavior. Consistent with 
insider purchases, in both Panel A and Panel B, directors’ abnormal returns on sales are 






The job of an independent director is part-time in nature.  As “relative outsiders” 
to the firm, independent directors have an information disadvantage vis-à-vis managers. 
Further, managers may not have incentives to share information with directors who are 
their monitors and evaluators. Hence, the information disadvantage faced by independent 
directors, and the role of board meetings in mitigating information asymmetry between 
independent directors and insiders, are of concern to regulation setters, investors, and 
corporate practitioners. 
In this study I address the boards’ information problem by shedding light on the 
role of board meetings. I examine whether board meetings help reduce independent 
directors’ information disadvantage, and how past regulations and cross-sectional 
differences associated with directors and board meetings characteristics impact the role of 
board meetings in mitigating information asymmetry between insiders and outside 
directors. The results suggest that board meetings can function as an information channel 
for independent directors, that the 2003 board independence requirements enabled this 
function for board meetings, and that directors who possess specific expertise or who are 
more disadvantaged information-wise gain significantly more from higher board meeting 
frequency. In addition, I provide evidence that in-person board meetings and remote 
board meetings differ in their informational roles. I provide causal evidence of the effect 
of board meetings on directors’ acquisition of private information by a difference-in-




This study has important implications for regulators and practitioners: it shows 
that the information disadvantage faced by independent directors can be effectively 
reduced by adequate board meetings; it also shows that independent directors’ access to 
firm-specific private information serves as an effective monitoring mechanism on 
managers’ insider trading behaviors. This study focuses on the informational role of 
board meetings, while board meetings are not the only channel/mechanism that are 
employed by the board of directors. For example, firms listed in NYSE and NASDAQ 
stock exchanges typically hold executive sessions, in which only non-executive directors 
participate while managers avoid. In the future, more research can be done to examine the 
effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of various mechanisms that are employed by the board 







Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definition Source 
Main Variables of Interest  
BHAR 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns calculated over 180-day 
period after insider's transaction date CRSP 
DIRECTOR 
Indicator variable set to 1 if the insider purchase is made 
by an independent director, 0 if the insider purchase is 
made by an executive Thomson 
MF Total number of board meetings held over the fiscal year 
ExecuComp (fiscal 
years 1992 to 
2005); SEC Edgar 
(fiscal years 2006 
to 2015) LOGMF 
Natural logarithm of (1 + total number of board meetings 
held over the fiscal year) 
POST 
Indicator variable set to 1 if fiscal year is 2004 or later, 0 
otherwise Compustat 
DIRECTOR_T 
Indicator variable set to 1 if the insider purchase is made 
by an independent director in treated firms, 0 otherwise; 
treated firms are firms with less than 50% of independent 




Indicator variable set to 1 if the insider purchase is made 
by an independent director in control firms, 0 otherwise; 
treated firms are firms with less than 50% of independent 




Indicator variable set to 1 if director's tenure is shorter 
than sample median of 5 years, 0 otherwise RiskMetrics (ISS) 
TENURE_H 
Indicator variable set to 1 if director's tenure is longer than 
sample median of 5 years, 0 otherwise RiskMetrics (ISS) 
COMM 
Indicator variable set to 1 if director sits on any of Audit, 
Compensation, or Nomination Committees, 0 otherwise RiskMetrics (ISS) 
NONCOMM 
Indicator variable set to 1 if director does not sit on any of  
Audit, Compensation, or Nomination Committees, 0 
otherwise RiskMetrics (ISS) 
CONNECTED 
Indicator variable set to 1 if director sits on at least one 
other board, 0 otherwise RiskMetrics (ISS) 
NONCONNECTED 
Indicator variable set to 1 if director does not sit on other 
board, 0 otherwise RiskMetrics (ISS) 
ATTEND 
Indicator variable set to 1 if director did not attend less 
than 75% of total meetings during that fiscal year, 0 
otherwise RiskMetrics (ISS) 
ATTENDLESS 
Indicator variable set to 1 if director attended less than 







Book-to-market ratio, calculated as Compustat items 
ceq/(csho*prcc_f), all measured at the end of fiscal year Compustat 
CAPEX 
Capital expenditure, calculated as Compustat items 
capx/at, measured at the end of fiscal year Compustat 
CEO_CHAIR 
Indicator variable set to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman 
of the board, 0 otherwise ExecuComp 
CEO_TENURE 
Number of years the CEO has been serving as the firm's 
CEO ExecuComp 
LAGTRADE 
Indicator variable set to 1 if director's trade falls in the     
3-day window of the disclosure of a same-firm executive's 
trade, 0 otherwise Thomsom 
LEV 
Leverage, calculated as Compustat items (dlc + dltt)/at, 
measured at the end of fiscal year Compustat 
M&A 
Indicator variable set to 1 if the firm undergoes M&A 
transactions during the fiscal year SDC Platinum 
RESTRICT 
Indicator variable set to 1 if at least 75% of all insider 
trades during the fiscal year fall into the 1-month window 




Buy-and-hold stock returns over the 12-month window 
preceding insider's transaction month CRSP; Thomson 
RET_FY Buy-and-hold stock returns over the fiscal year CRSP 
RETVOL 
Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the 12-
month window preceding insider's transaction month CRSP; Thomson 
RETVOL_FY 
Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the fiscal 
year CRSP 
ROA 
Return on assets, calculated as Compustat items ib/at, 
measured at the end of fiscal year Compustat 
SIZE 
Firm size, calculated as the natural logarithm of 








Table 1. Sample Construction 
ExecuComp sample, 1992 to 2015 43,082 
Less: financial services and utilities industries (SIC codes 4900 to 4999, 6000 to 
6799) 9,391 
Less: observations missing board meeting frequency data 969 
Less: observations missing Compustat data  188 
Less: observations missing CRSP data 981 
Final sample at firm-year level 31,553 
  
Merge with Thompson Reuters insider purchase data 126,322 
Less: purchases made by insiders other than executives or independent directors 49,434 
Less: purchases with shares less than 100 or transaction price less than $2 7,223 






Table 2. Statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N 25% 50% Mean 75% Std. Dev 
Firm-year Level:       
MF 31,553 5 7 7.440 9 3.131 
LOGMF 31,553 1.609 1.946 1.931 2.197 0.379 
SIZE 31,553 5.941 6.951 7.104 8.128 1.601 
BTM 31,553 0.245 0.403 0.484 0.623 0.376 
LEV 31,553 0.044 0.198 0.215 0.329 0.184 
RET_FY 31,553 -0.141 0.105 0.176 0.377 0.526 
RETVOL_FY 31,553 0.072 0.101 0.117 0.144 0.064 
ROA 31,553 0.018 0.053 0.040 0.091 0.106 
CAPEX 31,553 0.022 0.042 0.058 0.074 0.055 
M&A 31,553 0 0 0.171 0 0.377 
CEO_CHAIR 31,553 0 1 0.534 1 0.499 
CEO_TENURE 31,553 3 6 7.712 10 6.929 
Transaction Level:       
BHAR 69,665 -0.166 0.034 0.122 0.283 0.488 
DIRECTOR 69,665 0 1 0.524 1 0.499 
RET 69,665 -0.316 -0.040 0.024 0.265 0.506 
RETVOL 69,665 0.080 0.112 0.124 0.152 0.062 
RESTRICT 69,665 0 0 0.198 0 0.398 




Panel B. Pearson Correlations at Firm-year Level 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 LOGMF -          
2 SIZE 0.162 -         
3 BTM 0.051 -0.031 -        
4 LEV 0.086 0.314 -0.014 -       
5 RET_FY -0.066 -0.069 -0.333 -0.074 -      
6 RETVOL_FY 0.081 -0.341 0.141 -0.027 0.076 -     
7 ROA -0.179 0.130 -0.249 -0.176 0.195 -0.348 -    
8 CAPEX -0.070 -0.038 -0.045 0.028 -0.026 0.018 0.071 -   
9 M&A 0.105 0.118 -0.054 0.033 -0.001 -0.037 0.027 -0.040 -  
10 CEO_CHAIR -0.037 0.227 -0.021 0.069 -0.021 -0.104 0.063 0.007 0.020 - 
11 CEO_TENURE -0.128 -0.042 0.013 -0.050 -0.001 -0.026 0.055 0.001 -0.004 0.263 
 
Panel C. Pearson Correlations at Transaction Level 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 LOGMF -              
2 BHAR -0.042 -             
3 DIRECTOR -0.011 -0.063 -            
4 SIZE 0.165 -0.096 0.065 -           
5 BTM 0.050 -0.101 -0.052 -0.015 -          
6 LEV 0.076 -0.048 -0.015 0.281 0.041 -         
7 RET -0.063 -0.104 0.069 0.029 -0.328 -0.123 -        
8 RETVOL 0.043 0.226 -0.094 -0.329 0.085 -0.006 -0.086 -       
9 ROA -0.121 0.057 0.044 0.189 -0.244 -0.230 0.287 -0.286 -      
10 CAPEX -0.010 -0.060 -0.033 0.105 -0.039 0.011 0.117 -0.047 0.132 -     
11 M&A 0.134 -0.016 -0.023 0.161 -0.070 0.029 0.062 -0.046 0.043 0.064 -    
12 CEO_CHAIR -0.036 -0.058 -0.007 0.244 -0.027 0.022 -0.005 -0.107 0.105 0.068 0.045 -   
13 CEO_TENURE -0.084 -0.028 -0.017 0.020 0.029 -0.041 -0.013 -0.004 0.030 0.095 0.014 0.279 -  
14 RESTRICT 0.017 0.045 0.025 -0.082 0.015 0.026 -0.035 0.077 -0.083 -0.063 -0.035 -0.102 -0.012 - 
15 LAGTRADE 0.022 0.019 0.155 -0.015 0.077 0.016 -0.063 0.017 -0.04 -0.003 -0.023 -0.035 -0.018 0.05 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in the regressions. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for all observations. Panel B 
presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the key variables at firm-year level. Panel C presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the key 




Table 3. Determinants of Board Meetings 
  1992 to 2015 1992 to 2002 2003 to 2015 
Dependent 
Variable: LOGMF (1) 
 (2)  (3)   
  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
SIZE 0.028*** (3.72) 0.039*** (4.54) 0.018* (1.80) 
BTM 0.034*** (3.22) 0.019 (1.17) 0.029* (1.83) 
LEV 0.077*** (3.06) 0.068* (1.76) 0.051 (1.53) 
RET_FY -0.013*** (-2.96) -0.007* (-1.70) -0.018** (-2.22) 
RETVOL_FY 0.467*** (6.99) 0.512*** (4.43) 0.571*** (6.14) 
ROA -0.377*** (-10.69) -0.395*** (-8.04) -0.300*** (-9.33) 
CAPEX -0.161** (-2.03) -0.170* (-1.93) -0.092 (-0.88) 
M&A 0.080*** (12.82) 0.072*** (13.91) 0.092*** (10.42) 
CEO_CHAIR -0.013** (-2.00) 0.002 (0.25) -0.012 (-1.28) 
CEO_TENURE -0.002*** (-3.54) -0.001 (-0.77) -0.002** (-2.09) 
Constant 1.734*** (28.05) 1.522*** (23.12) 1.802*** (23.22) 
N 31,553  14,250  17,303  
Adj. !! 0.460  0.555  0.482  
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes   Yes  Yes  
This table presents the results of regressing natural logarithm of board meeting frequency on a group 
of firm and CEO characteristics: 
LOGMF= a0 + b1 SIZE + b2 BTM + b3 LEV + b4 RET_FY + b5 RETVOL_FY + b6 
ROA + b7 CAPEX + b8 M&A + b9 CEO_CHAIR + b10 CEO_TENURE +  Firm Fixed 
Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it (5) 
Column (1) shows the regression analysis for the entire sample period of 1992 to 2015. Column (2) 
shows the regression analysis for subsample of 1992 to 2002. Column (3) shows the regression 
analysis for subsample of 2003 to 2015. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 
percentile. Standard errors are clustered at firm and year level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 




Table 4. Univariate Analyses on Insiders’ Purchase Returns 
Panel A. 1992 to 2015        
    Firm-year Level Transaction Level Average BHAR Diff 
Quintile Meetings N obs. Percentage N obs. Percentage Managers Directors Mngr - Dir t-stat 
1 <= 4 4,539 14.4% 9,081 13.0% 0.187 0.110 0.077*** 7.23 
2 5 to 6 10,384 32.9% 22,350 32.1% 0.168 0.090 0.079*** 12.27 
3 7 to 8 7,786 24.7% 17,279 24.8% 0.183 0.099 0.083*** 11.62 
4 9 to 11 5,678 18.0% 13,817 19.8% 0.118 0.079 0.039*** 4.57 
5 >= 12 3,166 10.0% 7,138 10.2% 0.077 0.083 -0.006 -0.51 
Diff of Q1 - Q5     0.110*** 0.027**   
t-stat           9.67 2.40     
          
Panel B. 1992 to 2002 (pre-2003 regulation changes) 
    Firm-year Level Transaction Level Average BHAR Diff 
Quintile Meetings N obs. Percentage N obs. Percentage Managers Directors Mngr - Dir t-stat 
1 <= 4 2,625 18.4% 5,382 17.1% 0.114 0.093 0.021 1.54 
2 5 to 6 4,976 34.9% 11,387 36.1% 0.116 0.091 0.025*** 2.77 
3 7 to 8 3,286 23.1% 7,455 23.7% 0.204 0.067 0.136*** 11.86 
4 9 to 11 2,342 16.4% 5,100 16.2% 0.118 0.079 0.038** 2.50 
5 >= 12 1,021 7.2% 2,178 6.9% 0.134 0.146 -0.013 -0.44 
Diff of Q1 - Q5     -0.020 -0.054***   





      
Panel C. 2003 to 2015 (post-2003 regulation changes) 
    Firm-year Level Transaction Level Average BHAR Diff 
Quintile Meetings N obs. Percentage N obs. Percentage Managers Directors Mngr - Dir t-stat 
1 <= 4 1,914 11.1% 3,699 9.7% 0.304 0.133 0.171*** 10.38 
2 5 to 6 5,408 31.3% 10,963 28.7% 0.234 0.088 0.146*** 16.19 
3 7 to 8 4,500 26.0% 9,824 25.7% 0.163 0.119 0.043*** 4.75 
4 9 to 11 3,336 19.3% 8,717 22.8% 0.118 0.079 0.039*** 3.89 
5 >= 12 2,145 12.4% 4,960 13.0% 0.051 0.057 -0.006 -0.48 
Diff of Q1 - Q5     0.253*** 0.077***   
t-stat           17.61 5.72     
This table tabulates the results of univariate tests on the differences between executives’ and directors’ buy-hold abnormal returns, when 
grouped into quintiles by number of board meetings. Panel A tabulates results for the whole sample period 1992 to 2015. Panel B tabulates 
results for subsample of 1992 to 2002. Panel C tabulates results for subsample of 2003 to 2015. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 




Table 5. Board Meetings as Information Channel 
Dependent Variable: 1992 to 2015 1992 to 2015 1992 to 2002 2003 to 3015 
2003 to 2015, 
excluding 2007 to 
2009 
BHAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
DIRECTOR*LOGMF   0.013 (0.55) -0.022 (-0.59) 0.069*** (3.97) 0.071*** (2.96) 
LOGMF   -0.048* (-1.70) 0.053 (1.47) -0.135*** (-4.33) -0.108*** (-2.86) 
DIRECTOR -0.025*** (-2.60) -0.050 (-1.10) 0.028 (0.40) -0.159*** (-3.65) -0.142*** (-2.81) 
SIZE -0.153*** (-5.30) -0.153*** (-5.22) -0.303*** (-6.48) -0.089*** (-3.94) -0.089*** (-4.28) 
BTM -0.232*** (-6.26) -0.231*** (-6.22) -0.286*** (-7.13) -0.225*** (-3.75) -0.333*** (-5.57) 
LEV -0.066 (-1.00) -0.063 (-0.96) 0.056 (0.43) -0.183* (-1.82) -0.167 (-1.09) 
RET -0.213*** (-7.07) -0.215*** (-7.10) -0.200*** (-6.52) -0.270*** (-5.13) -0.210*** (-4.90) 
RETVOL 1.080*** (2.79) 1.090*** (2.80) 0.280 (0.89) 1.748*** (2.96) 0.737** (2.22) 
ROA 0.558*** (6.09) 0.547*** (5.84) 0.902*** (6.11) 0.283** (2.33) 0.088 (0.69) 
CAPEX -1.095*** (-4.72) -1.101*** (-4.77) -1.509*** (-6.08) -0.987** (-2.50) -1.636*** (-4.72) 
M&A -0.004 (-0.25) -0.001 (-0.04) 0.018 (0.82) -0.015 (-0.66) -0.020 (-0.86) 
CEO_CHAIR -0.030** (-1.97) -0.031** (-2.05) -0.005 (-0.23) -0.018 (-0.85) -0.017 (-0.78) 
CEO_TENURE -0.000 (-0.24) -0.000 (-0.21) -0.002* (-1.66) 0.002 (1.09) 0.001 (0.72) 
LAGTRADE 0.062*** (2.97) 0.062*** (2.96) 0.057** (2.01) 0.040 (1.49) 0.008 (0.37) 
RESTRICT 0.029 (1.34) 0.029 (1.34) 0.003 (0.10) 0.036 (1.15) 0.003 (0.15) 
Constant 1.285*** (5.19) 1.372*** (5.95) 2.321*** (6.40) 0.986*** (5.44) 1.132*** (6.32) 
N 69,665  69,665  31,502  38,163  22,664  
Adj. R-squared 0.397  0.398  0.439  0.473  0.543  
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-test of Col.(3) Coeff. = Col.(4) Coeff.: DIRECTOR*LOGMF LOGMF           
F-stat   3.62*  11.45***      
P-value     0.057   0.001           
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (1) on insider purchases: 
BHAR = a0 + b1 DIRECTOR*LOGMF + b2 LOGMF + b3 DIRECTOR +  b4 SIZE + b5 BTM + b6 LEV + b7 RET + b8 RETVOL + b9 




Fixed Effects + e it 
 (1) 
Column (1) shows the regression result for the entire sample period of 1992 to 2015. Column (2) shows the regression result for subsample of 
1992 to 2002. Column (3) shows the regression result for subsample of 2003 to 2015. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 
percentile. Standard errors are clustered at firm and year level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. All 





Table 6. Regulation Changes – Board Independence Requirements and SOX 
Dependent Variable: BHAR (1) (2) 
  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
POST*DIRECTOR_T*LOGMF   0.157*** (2.97) 
POST*DIRECTOR_C*LOGMF   -0.014 (-0.26) 
DIRECTOR_T*LOGMF   -0.143** (-2.51) 
DIRECTOR_C*LOGMF   0.042 (0.98) 
POST*LOGMF   -0.085* (-1.69) 
POST*DIRECTOR_T 0.014 (0.43) -0.278*** (-2.70) 
POST*DIRECTOR_C 0.025 (1.41) 0.050 (0.44) 
POST -0.094* (-1.66) 0.074 (0.67) 
DIRECTOR_T -0.062** (-2.09) 0.198* (1.81) 
DIRECTOR_C -0.033*** (-2.69) -0.113 (-1.38) 
LOGMF -0.043 (-1.38) -0.006 (-0.14) 
SIZE -0.176*** (-4.47) -0.177*** (-4.47) 
BTM -0.181*** (-4.53) -0.181*** (-4.55) 
LEV -0.084 (-0.62) -0.080 (-0.59) 
RET -0.275*** (-5.37) -0.274*** (-5.33) 
RETVOL 1.257*** (3.23) 1.244*** (3.17) 
ROA 0.375*** (2.88) 0.380*** (2.87) 
CAPEX -1.331*** (-4.51) -1.309*** (-4.44) 
M&A 0.004 (0.17) 0.004 (0.19) 
CEO_CHAIR -0.025 (-0.94) -0.026 (-0.97) 
CEO_TENURE -0.000 (-0.21) -0.000 (-0.26) 
LAGTRADE 0.031 (1.30) 0.030 (1.28) 
RESTRICT 0.044 (1.53) 0.043 (1.52) 
Constant 1.633*** (5.47) 1.570*** (5.01) 
N 42,844  42,844  
Adj. R-squared 0.428  0.429  
Firm FE Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes   Yes   
This table presents the results of estimating Equations (2) and (3): 
BHAR = a0 + b1 POST*DIRECTOR_T + b2 POST*DIRECTOR_C + b3 POST + b4 
DIRECTOR_T + b5  DIRECTOR_C + b6 LOGMF + b7 SIZE + b8 BTM + b9 LEV + b10 
RET + b11 RETVOL + b12 ROA + b13 CAPEX + b14 M&A + b15 LAGTRADE + b16 
RESTRICT + Firm Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it          (2) 
 
BHAR = a0 + b1 POST*DIRECTOR_T*LOGMF + b2 POST*DIRECTOR_C*LOGMF 
+ b3 POST*DIRECTOR_T +  b4 POST*DIRECTOR_C + b5 DIRECTOR_T*LOGMF + 
b6 DIRECTOR_C*LOGMF + b7 POST*LOGMF + b8 POST + b9 DIRECTOR_T + b10  
DIRECTOR_C + b11 LOGMF + b12 SIZE + b13 BTM + b14 LEV + b15 RET + b16 
RETVOL + b17 ROA + b18 CAPEX + b19 M&A + b20 LAGTRADE + b21 RESTRICT 
+ Firm Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it                      (3)         
Column (1) shows the regression result of Equation (2). Column (2) shows the regression result of Equation 
(3). Columns (3) and (4) repeats columns (1) and (2) with additional controls of BOARD_INDE and 
BOARD_SIZE. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 
99% percentile. Standard errors are clustered at firm and year level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 




Table 7. Independent Directors’ Characteristics and Information Gap 
Dependent Variable: BHAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
TENURE_L*LOGMF 0.105*** (4.79)         
TENURE_H*LOGMF -0.027 (-0.66)         
TENRE_L -0.234*** (-5.09)         
TENURE_H 0.049 (0.64)         
DIVERSE*LOGMF   0.092** (2.12)       
NONDIVERSE*LOGMF   0.031 (1.10)       
DIVERSE   -0.203** (-2.28)       
NONDIVERSE   -0.077 (-1.49)       
COMM*LOGMF     0.073*** (2.78)     
NONCOMM*LOGMF     -0.015 (-0.26)     
COMM     -0.169*** (-3.60)     
NONCOMM     0.050 (0.39)     
CONNECTED*LOGMF       0.048* (1.73)   
NONCONNECTED*LOG
MF 
      0.030 (0.67)   
CONNECTED       -0.110** (-2.31)   
NONCONNECTED       -0.075 (-0.77)   
ATTEND*LOGMF         0.043* (1.74) 
ATTENDLESS*LOGMF         -0.276 (-1.31) 
ATTEND         -0.101** (-2.24) 
ATTENDLESS         0.659 (1.28) 
LOGMF -0.120*** (-3.27) -0.120*** (-3.26) -0.128*** (-3.23) -0.121*** (-3.26) -0.120*** (-3.27) 
SIZE -0.118*** (-3.39) -0.117*** (-3.30) -0.115*** (-3.22) -0.118*** (-3.25) -0.119*** (-3.36) 
BTM -0.211*** (-3.30) -0.212*** (-3.30) -0.213*** (-3.33) -0.212*** (-3.30) -0.211*** (-3.29) 
LEV -0.166 (-1.15) -0.162 (-1.12) -0.161 (-1.11) -0.163 (-1.12) -0.162 (-1.12) 
RET -0.293*** (-5.36) -0.291*** (-5.33) -0.292*** (-5.37) -0.292*** (-5.33) -0.291*** (-5.32) 
RETVOL 1.527*** (2.94) 1.521*** (2.92) 1.525*** (2.93) 1.522*** (2.93) 1.516*** (2.90) 
ROA 0.220 (1.50) 0.214 (1.46) 0.225 (1.54) 0.217 (1.47) 0.218 (1.48) 
CAPEX -0.913** (-2.01) 0.022 (0.52) -0.902* (-1.93) -0.908* (-1.94) -0.874* (-1.94) 




CEO_CHAIR 0.020 (0.47) -0.898* (-1.90) 0.020 (0.48) 0.021 (0.50) 0.021 (0.50) 
CEO_TENURE 0.002 (0.55) -0.019 (-0.78) 0.002 (0.49) 0.002 (0.49) 0.002 (0.49) 
LAGTRADE 0.023 (0.91) 0.024 (0.96) 0.021 (0.82) 0.024 (0.94) 0.024 (0.94) 
RESTRICT -0.029 (-1.00) -0.027 (-0.91) -0.028 (-0.97) -0.027 (-0.93) -0.027 (-0.92) 
Constant 1.182*** (3.50) 1.180*** (3.44) 1.174*** (3.39) 1.185*** (3.41) 1.193*** (3.48) 
N 28861  28861  28861  28861  28861  
Adj. R-Squared 0.498  0.497  0.498  0.497  0.497  
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-test of type_A*LOGMF = nontype_A*LOGMF:                 
F-stat 8.64***  1.29  3.09*  0.21  2.38  
P-value 0.003   0.259   0.079   0.645   0.123   
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (4): 
BHAR = a0 + b1 TYPE_A*LOGMF + b2 NON_TYPE_A*LOGMF + b3 TYPE_A + b4 NON_TYPE_A + b5 LOGMF + b6 SIZE + b7 BTM + b8 
LEV + b9 RET + b10 RETVOL + b11 ROA + b12 CAPEX + b13 M&A + b14 CEO_CHAIR + b15 CEO_TENURE + b16 LAGTRADE + b17 
RESTRICT + Firm Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it          (4) 
 
TYPE_A and NON_TYPE_A are indicator variables for mutually exclusive classifications of independent directors; they are: in Column (1), 
directors with below median tenure (TENURE_L) and directors with above median tenure (TENURE_H); in Column (2), diverse directors 
(DIVERSE) (female or racial minority) and non-diverse directors (NONDIVERSE); in Column (3), directors sitting on 
Audit/Compensation/Nomination Committees (COMM) and directors do not sit on either of these committees (NONCOMM); in Column (4), 
connected directors(CONNECTED) and non-connected directors (NONCONNECTED); in Column (5),directors who attend at least 75% of total 
board meetings (ATTEND) and directors who attend less than 75% of total board meetings (ATTENDLESS). All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% percentile. Standard errors are clustered at firm and year level. ***, **, * 





Table 8. Difference-in-differences Analysis of Board Meeting Frequencies 
Dependent Variable: BHAR (1) (2) 
  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
ELECTION_SENSITIVE*DIRECTOR*LOG
MF 0.205*** (3.67) 0.363** (2.32) 
ELECTION_SENSITIVE *LOGMF -0.281*** (-3.77) -0.415*** (-2.77) 
ELECTION_SENSITIVE *DIRECTOR -0.306** (-2.40) -0.741** (-2.51) 
ELECTION_SENSITIVE 0.523*** (3.20) 0.856*** (2.94) 
LOGMF 0.005 (0.15) -0.025 (-0.53) 
DIRECTOR 0.031 (1.65) -0.006 (-0.50) 
SIZE -0.021* (-1.73) -0.214*** (-4.85) 
BTM -0.179*** (-5.95) -0.276*** (-5.13) 
LEV -0.043 (-0.60) -0.136 (-0.84) 
RET -0.055 (-1.14) -0.154*** (-8.58) 
RETVOL 0.503 (0.97) 0.316 (1.16) 
ROA 0.187 (1.23) 0.002 (0.01) 
CAPEX -0.839*** (-3.35) -2.206*** (-5.36) 
M&A -0.038 (-1.27) -0.037 (-0.94) 
CEO_CHAIR -0.010 (-0.40) 0.001 (0.03) 
CEO_TENURE -0.002 (-0.88) -0.000 (-0.15) 
LAGTRADE -0.022 (-1.60) -0.005 (-0.32) 
RESTRICT 0.027 (1.17) -0.009 (-0.32) 
Constant 0.288** (2.47) 1.937*** (5.26) 
N 11,703  11,703  
Adj. !! 0.186  0.532  
Industry FE Yes  No  
Firm FE No  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes   
This table presents the regression analyses using the following model: 
BHAR = a0 + b1 ELECTION_SENSITIVE*DIRECTOR*LOGMF + b2 
ELECTION_SENSITIVE *LOGMF + b3 ELECTION_SENSITIVE *DIRECTOR +b4 
ELECTION_SENSITIVE + b5 LOGMF + b6 DIRECTOR + b7 SIZE + b8 BTM + b9 LEV + b10 
RET + b11 RETVOL + b12 ROA + b13 CAPEX + b14 M&A + b15 CEO_CHAIR + b16 
CEO_TENURE + b17 LAGTRADE + b18 RESTRICT + Industry Fixed Effects/Firm Fixed 
Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it   (6) 
Where ELECTION_SENSITIVE is an indicator variable that equals 1 for firms in political sensitive 
industries during presidential election year, 0 otherwise. Column (1) includes industry fixed effects 
and year fixed effects, Column (2) includes firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. All rest variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% percentile. Column 
(1) standard errors are clustered at industry and year level, Column (2) standard errors are clustered at 
firm and year level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. The 




Table 9. In-person Board Meetings and Remote Board Meetings 
Panel A. Distribution of Remote Meetings 
   # of Remote Meeting % Remote Meeting 
Year N obs. (firm-year) Mean Median Mean Median 
1994 28 2.57 2 31.3% 28.2% 
1995 55 2.76 2 29.0% 25.0% 
1996 79 2.42 2 30.1% 28.6% 
1997 99 2.96 2 35.0% 33.3% 
1998 90 3.14 3 37.1% 37.5% 
1999 93 3.58 2 37.8% 33.3% 
2000 93 4.40 4 42.9% 42.9% 
2001 86 3.52 2.5 38.4% 33.3% 
2002 89 3.64 3 38.0% 33.3% 
2003 81 3.75 2 38.3% 33.3% 
2004 91 3.65 3 39.9% 36.4% 
2005 110 4.01 3 38.5% 37.5% 
2006 107 3.42 3 37.7% 33.3% 
2007 104 3.31 2 36.7% 33.3% 
2008 92 4.02 3 38.0% 38.8% 
2009 93 3.68 3 37.4% 33.3% 
2010 84 3.69 3 38.6% 38.2% 
2011 89 3.51 2 37.1% 33.3% 
2012 78 3.54 2 37.8% 33.3% 
2013 72 3.26 2 36.5% 33.3% 
2014 72 3.63 3 36.2% 33.3% 






Panel B. Regression Analyses of In-person Board Meetings and Remote Board Meetings 
Dependent Variable: BHAR (1) (2) (2) 
  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
DIRECTOR*LOGMF_INPERSON 0.314** (2.06)     
LOGMF_INPERSON -0.078 (-0.24)     
DIRECTOR*LOGMF_REMOTE   -0.155* (-1.86)   
LOGMF_REMOTE   0.049 (0.73)   
DIRECTOR*LOGMF     -0.130 (-0.97) 
LOGMF     0.027 (0.19) 
DIRECTOR -0.584** (-2.16) 0.164 (1.34) 0.226 (0.80) 
SIZE -0.023 (-0.83) -0.019 (-0.70) -0.016 (-0.59) 
BTM -0.336*** (-4.51) -0.328*** (-5.43) -0.329*** (-5.21) 
LEV -0.136 (-0.87) -0.157 (-0.99) -0.159 (-0.99) 
RET -0.250*** (-3.97) -0.252*** (-3.82) -0.251*** (-3.77) 
RETVOL 0.618 (1.31) 0.675 (1.33) 0.707 (1.32) 
ROA 0.274*** (2.65) 0.240** (2.29) 0.239** (2.20) 
CAPEX -0.953** (-2.12) -0.938** (-2.18) -0.905* (-1.88) 
CEO_TENURE 0.004 (1.11) 0.005 (1.41) 0.004 (1.32) 
CEO_CHAIR -0.080 (-0.98) -0.087 (-1.11) -0.082 (-1.02) 
LAGTRADE -0.021 (-0.23) -0.045 (-0.53) -0.034 (-0.39) 
RESTRICT -0.090 (-0.99) -0.076 (-0.81) -0.081 (-0.88) 
Constant 0.620 (1.31) 0.369* (1.73) 0.354 (1.19) 
N 3153  3153  3153  
Adj. R-squared 0.338  0.341  0.336  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes   
F-test of DIRECOTR*LOGMF_INPERSON = DIRECTOR*LOGMF_REMOTE: 
F-stat 6.74***      
P-value 0.009           
Panel A presents the distribution of remote board meetings by year, in terms of the number of remote board meetings (# of Remote Meeting) and 
the percentage of remote board meetings in total board meetings (% Remote Meeting). Panel B presents the regression analyses of in-person 




BHAR = a0 + b1 DIRECTOR*LOGMF_TYPE + b2 LOGMF_TYPE + b3 DIRECTOR +  b4 SIZE + b5 BTM + b6 LEV + b7 RET + b8 
RETVOL + b9 ROA + b10 CAPEX + b11 M&A + b12 CEO_CHAIR + b13 CEO_TENURE + b14 LAGTRADE + b15 RESTRICT + Firm 
Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it   (7) 
Column (1) examines in-person board meetings (LOGMF_INPERSON), Column (2) examines remote board meetings (LOGMF_REMOTE), 
Column (3) examines total number of board meetings (which equals to in-person plus remote meetings) (LOGMF). All rest variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% percentile. Standard errors are clustered at industry and year level. ***, 




Table 10. Lead-lag Analyses of Board Meeting Frequencies 
Panel A. Insider Purchase Distribution by Month in Fiscal Year 
      Managers Directors 
Month in Fiscal 
Year N obs. % of total obs. N obs. % of total obs. N obs. % of total obs. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 2,438 3.5% 1,058 3.2% 1,380 3.8% 
2 8,214 11.8% 3,548 10.7% 4,666 12.8% 
3 7,119 10.2% 3,204 9.7% 3,915 10.7% 
4 3,620 5.2% 1,541 4.7% 2,079 5.7% 
5 8,774 12.6% 3,951 11.9% 4,823 13.2% 
6 4,255 6.1% 2,295 6.9% 1,960 5.4% 
7 4,373 6.3% 2,263 6.8% 2,110 5.8% 
8 9,771 14.0% 4,790 14.5% 4,981 13.6% 
9 3,644 5.2% 1,904 5.8% 1,740 4.8% 
10 4,402 6.3% 2,028 6.1% 2,374 6.5% 
11 8,541 12.3% 4,075 12.3% 4,466 12.2% 
12 4,514 6.5% 2,469 7.5% 2,045 5.6% 
Total 69,665 100.0% 33,126 100.0% 36,539 100.0% 
Panel B. Regression Analysis using Estimated 12-month Pre-trade Board Meeting Frequencies 
  1992 to 2015 1992 to 2002 2003 to 3015 
Dependent Variable: BHAR (1) (2) (3) 
  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
DIRECTOR*LOGMF_PRETRADE 0.010 (0.35) -0.043 (-0.99) 0.082*** (2.95) 
LOGMF_PRETRADE -0.048 (-0.91) 0.062 (0.79) -0.185*** (-3.20) 
DIRECTOR -0.063** (-1.97) 0.085* (1.74) -0.175*** (-4.62) 
N 64,002  28,539  35,463  
Adj. !! 0.391  0.442  0.459  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  




Panel C.  Regression Analysis using Estimated 12-month Post-trade Board Meeting Frequencies 
  1992 to 2015 1992 to 2002 2003 to 3015 
Dependent Variable: BHAR (1) (2) (3) 
  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
DIRECTOR*LOGMF_POSTTRADE -0.018 (-0.63) -0.024 (-0.60) 0.007 (0.19) 
LOGMF_POSTTRADE -0.105** (-2.41) -0.146** (-2.04) -0.133* (-1.87) 
DIRECTOR 0.013 (0.22) 0.037 (0.46) -0.035 (-0.37) 
N 64,602  29,179  35,423  
Adj. !! 0.391  0.442  0.459  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm FE and Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes   
 
Panel D. Regression Analysis using Board Meeting Frequencies in Year t-1 
  1992 to 2015 1992 to 2002 2003 to 3015 
Dependent Variable: BHAR (1) (2) (3) 
  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
DIRECTOR*LOGMFt-1 -0.018 (-0.71) -0.056 (-1.52) 0.011 (0.35) 
LOGMFt-1 0.006 (0.25) 0.012 (0.30) 0.012 (0.36) 
DIRECTOR 0.006 (0.12) 0.086 (1.29) -0.041 (-0.72) 
N 64,002  28,539  35,463  
Adj. !! 0.390  0.442  0.456  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  








Panel E. Regression Analysis using Board Meeting Frequencies in Year t+1 
  1992 to 2015 1992 to 2002 2003 to 3015 
Dependent Variable: BHAR (1) (2) (3) 
  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
DIRECTOR*LOGMFt+1 -0.012 (-0.44) 0.016 (0.45) -0.015 (-0.38) 
LOGMFt+1 -0.085** (-2.40) -0.159*** (-3.71) -0.074 (-1.36) 
DIRECTOR -0.001 (-0.01) -0.041 (-0.65) 0.010 (0.11) 
N 64,602  29,179  35,423  
Adj. !! 0.403  0.448  0.464  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm FE and Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Panel A presents the number and percentage of insider purchase transactions by transaction month in fiscal year. Column (1) and (2) present the 
total transactions of both managers and independent directors; Column (3) and (4) present managers’ transactions; Column (5) and (6) present 
independent directors’ transactions. Panel B to Panel E present the findings of regressing 4 alternative measures of board meeting frequencies on 
insider purchase abnormal returns. The 4 measures are: in Panel B, the sum of monthly average board meetings of 12 months prior to the 
transaction month; in Panel B, the sum of monthly average board meetings of 12 months after the transaction month; in Panel D, the board 
meeting frequency in year t-1; in Panel E, the board meeting frequency in year t+1. The regression model follows Equation (1): 
BHAR = a0 + b1 DIRECTOR*LOGMF + b2 LOGMF + b3 DIRECTOR +  b4 SIZE + b5 BTM + b6 LEV + b7 RET + b8 RETVOL + b9 
ROA + b10 CAPEX + b11 M&A + b12 CEO_CHAIR + b13 CEO_TENURE + b14 LAGTRADE + b15 RESTRICT + Firm Fixed Effects + 
Year Fixed Effects + e it (1) 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% percentile. Standard errors are clustered at firm 





Table 11. The Effect of SOX 403 on Directors’ Trading Behavior 
Dependent Variable: LAGTRADE (1) (2) 
  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
SOX403*LOGMF   -0.071 (-0.12) 
SOX403 1.573*** (4.02) 1.719 (1.55) 
LOGMF 0.483* (1.73) 0.537 (1.21) 
SIZE -0.064 (-0.36) -0.065 (-0.37) 
BTM 0.634*** (3.26) 0.634*** (3.27) 
LEV -0.456 (-0.36) -0.456 (-0.36) 
RET -0.616** (-2.39) -0.616** (-2.38) 
RETVOL -0.835 (-0.40) -0.851 (-0.41) 
ROA -1.901* (-1.75) -1.903* (-1.75) 
CAPEX 3.169 (1.49) 3.166 (1.49) 
M&A -0.370 (-1.47) -0.369 (-1.48) 
CEO_CHAIR 0.144 (0.81) 0.144 (0.81) 
CEO_TENURE -0.012 (-0.66) -0.012 (-0.65) 
RESTRICT 0.364* (1.69) 0.363* (1.64) 
Constant -17.129*** (-10.68) -17.201*** (-10.33) 
N 14,336  14,336  
Pseudo !! 0.263  0.263  
Firm FE Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes   
This table presents the Logit regression results of estimating the following two equations: 
Prob(LAGTRADE) = a0 + b1 SOX403 + b2 LOGMF + b3 SIZE + b4 BTM + b5 LEV + 
b6 RET + b7 RETVOL + b8 ROA + b9 CAPEX + b10 M&A + b11 CEO_CHAIR + b12 
CEO_TENURE + b13 RESTRICT + Firm Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it (8) 
Prob(LAGTRADE) = a0 + b1 SOX403*LOGMF + b2 SOX403 + b3 LOGMF + b4 SIZE 
+ b5 BTM + b6 LEV + b7 RET + b8 RETVOL + b9 ROA + b10 CAPEX + b11 M&A + b12 
CEO_CHAIR + b13 CEO_TENURE + b14 RESTRICT + Firm Fixed Effects + Year Fixed 
Effects + e it (9) 
Observations for Equations (8) and (9) are occurrence of directors’ purchases. LAGTRADE is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the director’s purchase falls in the 3-day window of the 
disclosure of a same-firm executive’s purchases, 0 otherwise. SOX403 is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the transaction is made after August 29, 2002, and 0 otherwise. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% percentile. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm and year level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 




Table 12. Board Meetings and Insider Sales 
  All insider sales Opportunistic insider sales 
 1992 to 2002 2003 to 2015 1992 to 2002 2003 to 2015 
Dependent Variable: BHAR (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
DIRECTOR*LOGMF -0.006 (-0.35) 0.027** (2.16) -0.004 (-0.23) 0.029** (2.21) 
LOGMF -0.022 (-0.63) 0.022 (1.29) -0.017 (-0.49) 0.015 (0.82) 
DIRECTOR -0.011 (-0.34) -0.071*** (-2.71) -0.015 (-0.48) -0.071*** (-2.66) 
SIZE 0.225*** (5.99) 0.107*** (4.08) 0.229*** (6.35) 0.103*** (4.01) 
BTM 1.347*** (5.23) 0.856*** (9.62) 1.321*** (5.18) 0.827*** (9.62) 
LEV 0.267* (1.65) 0.313*** (5.00) 0.251 (1.54) 0.329*** (4.96) 
RET 0.085*** (3.63) 0.119*** (6.17) 0.091*** (3.80) 0.117*** (5.82) 
RETVOL 0.414* (1.95) -0.131 (-0.74) 0.399** (1.98) -0.178 (-0.95) 
ROA -0.189 (-0.81) 0.317** (2.00) -0.217 (-0.96) 0.259** (1.98) 
CAPEX 1.955*** (6.96) 1.638*** (9.46) 1.870*** (7.16) 1.684*** (9.55) 
M&A 0.049*** (2.86) 0.025 (1.22) 0.041*** (2.60) 0.029 (1.24) 
CEO_CHAIR -0.016 (-1.00) -0.013 (-0.77) -0.014 (-0.90) -0.013 (-0.73) 
CEO_TENURE -0.001 (-0.79) 0.000 (0.04) -0.001 (-0.67) 0.000 (0.17) 
LAGTRADE 0.027*** (4.02) 0.020** (2.24) 0.027*** (3.89) 0.015 (1.52) 
RESTRICT -0.005 (-0.23) -0.017** (-2.18) 0.004 (0.18) -0.015** (-2.02) 
Constant -2.280*** (-8.01) -1.385*** (-6.11) -2.308*** (-8.08) -1.331*** (-5.99) 
N 196,099  800,799  184,867  730,877  
Adj. !! 0.337  0.350  0.345  0.350  
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (1) on insider sales: 
BHAR = a0 + b1 DIRECTOR*LOGMF + b2 LOGMF + b3 DIRECTOR +  b4 SIZE + b5 BTM + b6 LEV + b7 RET + b8 RETVOL + 
b9 ROA + b10 CAPEX + b11 M&A + b12 CEO_CHAIR + b13 CEO_TENURE + b14 LAGTRADE + b15 RESTRICT + Firm Fixed 
Effects + Year Fixed Effects + e it (1) 
Columns (1) and (2) present the regression results using all managers’ and independent directors’ insider sale transactions; Columns (3) and (4) 
present the regression results using only opportunistic insider sale transactions, following Cohen et al. (2012). All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% percentile. Standard errors are clustered at firm and year level. ***, **, * 




Figure 1. Trends of Board Meetings Over Sample Period 
Figure 1A. Mean and Percentiles of Board Meeting Frequencies Over Years 
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